It is well known that the Hotelling-Downs model generically fails to admit an equilibrium when voting takes place under the plurality rule (Osborne 1993). This paper studies the HotellingDowns model considering that each voter is allowed to vote for up to k candidates and demonstrates that an equilibrium exists for a non-degenerate class of distributions of voters' ideal policies -which includes all log-concave distributions -if and only if k 2. That is, the plurality rule (k = 1) is shown to be the unique k-vote rule which generically precludes stability in electoral competition. Regarding the features of k-vote rules' equilibria, …rst, we show that there is no convergent equilibrium and, then, we fully characterize all divergent equilibria. We study comprehensively the simplest kind of divergent equilibria (two-location ones) and we argue that, apart from existing for quite a general class of distributions when k 2, they have further attractive properties -among others, they are robust to free-entry and to candidates'being uncertain about voters'preferences.
should be precisely identical to the number of their supporters on their right (right semi-constituency) -otherwise one of the candidates would have incentives to deviate towards the larger semi-constituency.
Notice that the unique convergent strategy pro…le that is compatible with these requirements, is when exactly two candidates enter the race and both locate at the median voter's ideal policy. Of course, this may never be an equilibrium, since any third candidate can get elected with certainty by entering, for example, marginally to the left of the ideal policy of the median voter. Most importantly, in the seminal contribution of Osborne (1993) it is shown that, for a generic distribution of voters' ideal policies, there is no divergent strategy pro…le that meets these tight conditions. Hence, there is generically no equilibrium in elections under the plurality rule.
When voters have k 2 votes, though, k + 1 candidates may be making the same most leftist (rightist) policy proposal in a divergent strategy pro…le and still it could be the case that none of them has any incentive to move marginally towards the right or towards the left -even if their left semi-constituency is not precisely identical in size to their right semi-constituency. This is so, because, when one does not deviate from the common policy proposal, one is voted by k k+1
of their constituency (which, for k 2, is much larger than half of the constituency); while, if their left semi-constituency is su¢ ciently similar (but not necessarily precisely identical) to their right semi-constituency, when one deviates marginally either to the left or to the right, one is voted by nearly half of their initial constituency. Indeed, by deviating marginally to the left (right), a candidate ranks strictly below the other k candidates for all voters with ideal policies to the right (left) of their initial policy proposal and, hence, su¤ers a severe drop in support. The transition from requiring that the two semi-constituencies are "precisely identical" (plurality) to just "su¢ ciently similar" (k-vote rules with k 2), gives an indication why equilibrium existence is no longer cut-edge when voters are allowed to vote for more than one candidate.
As far as qualitative features of equilibria are concerned, …rst, we argue that in equilibrium it is never the case that all active candidates 5 propose the same platform. That is, no k-vote rule admits a convergent equilibrium for any distribution of voters' preferences. Then we fully characterize all divergent equilibria of the game 6 and we exhaustively analyze the simple class of symmetric twolocation equilibria (equilibria such that half of the active candidates propose policy y 1 and the rest propose policy y 2 ). We demonstrate that these equilibria have certain very attractive properties when k 2: a) they are robust to free-entry (some potential candidates strategically decide not to enter the electoral race), b) the maximum number of active candidates is independent of the cardinality of the set of potential candidates, c) they are robust to candidates being after multiple o¢ ces 7 and, perhaps more importantly, d) they are robust to candidates'being uncertain about voters'preferences. The …rst two properties are important because they guarantee that the number of active candidates is completely endogenous, the third property extends the scope of the analysis to wider frameworks and the fourth property ensures that our results are relevant for real world elections -equilibria, which exist only when information about voters'preferences is perfect, raise obvious plausibility concerns.
We moreover prove that the set of distributions of voters'ideal policies for which such equilibria exist is expanding in k and, in particular, that this set becomes large enough to contain every log-concave distribution 8 when k becomes equal to two and every symmetric distribution (and every distribution in a neighborhood of each symmetric distribution) when k becomes equal to three. That is, we prove that: a) equilibria exist for a very general class of voters'preference pro…les when voters are allowed to vote for more than one candidate and b) by increasing the number of votes that a voter is allowed to cast, we increase the likelihood that electoral competition will reach stability.
Of course, this is not the …rst paper which studies such k-vote rules: Cox (1987) , Dellis (2009), Cahan et al. (2011) and Dellis and Oak (2015) are just some examples of papers which look at electoral competition when voters are allowed to cast more than one vote. In these papers however, either the set of competing candidates is exogenous and candidates are not win-motivated (it is assumed that candidates payo¤s are smoothly increasing in their vote-shares) or candidacy is endogenous; 9 but the policy platforms of candidates must coincide with their ideal policies (citizen-candidate models).
To the author's knowledge there is no paper which studies equilibrium existence under k-vote rules considering that both candidacy and positioning of win-motivated candidates are endogenous. This is precisely the gap in the literature that this paper aims to …ll.
Our analysis can be seen as a case for multiple votes since it demonstrates that, by giving the voters the opportunity to vote for more than one candidate, one creates the appropriate circumstances which may lead to stable outcomes. That is, multiple votes procedures are found to be better than the plurality rule in that respect. One should stress here, that other kinds of cases for multiple votes exist in the literature. In the literature of information aggregation, for example, Bouton and Castanheira (2012) recently showed that multiple vote procedures perform better than the plurality rule in that they admit only e¢ cient equilibria, while the plurality rule admits both e¢ cient and ine¢ cient ones.
Therefore, our results add to the voices that call for a serious reconsideration of the extent of use of the plurality rule in collective decision making -especially, in the context of representative democracy.
example, in certain Swiss cantons -including Zurich -voters are allowed to vote for as many candidates as the number of the seats of the canton's council), one would care to know whether our stability results apply to cases in which more than one individual is elected or not. As we will argue in the end of the paper, indeed, the identi…ed equilibria qualify for any M -winner system with M k. 8 Log-concave distributions of voters'ideal policies are widely used in electoral competition literature (see, for example, Caplin and Nalebu¤ 1991). 9 One is referred to Dutta et al. (2001) for a detailed presentation of the reasons why, for every voting rule, the precise assumption regarding candidacy -endogenous versus exogenous -is a crucial determinant of equilibrium policy outcomes.
In the remainder we present our formal setup (Section 2), we prove that a k-vote rule admits an equilibrium for non-degenerate classes of distributions of voters' ideal policies if and only if k 2 and we analyze in depth symmetric two-location equilibria 10 (Section 3), and, …nally, we demonstrate that our results are robust to candidates being uncertain about voters'preferences and to candidates being after multiple o¢ ces (Section 4).
The model
We have a set of win-motivated potential candidates who compete under a k-vote rule for an o¢ ce.
Formally, the set of potential candidates is N = N + . We also have a unit mass of voters, indexed 
the potential candidates'strategy pro…le. We moreover de…ne A = fi 2 N jy i 6 = Outg with a = #A (that is, a is the cardinality of the set A). If i 2 A then i is called an active candidate or entrant (not just a potential candidate). When considering a particular strategy pro…le Y = (y 1 ; y 2 ; :::) such that a …nite number of potential candidates enters the race, we denote by 0 y 1 < y 2 < ::: < y r 1 the r distinct policy platforms that belong to the strategy pro…le Y = (y 1 ; y 2 ; :::) and by n(y j ) the number of candidates who choose the policy platform y j . In line with Osborne (1993) we consider that the left semi-constituency of y j is given by F (y j ) F (
) for 2 j r and by F (y j ) for j = 1 and that the right semi-constituency of y j is de…ned symmetrically. The constituency of y j is the sum of its left and its right semi-constituencies.
After Y is determined, every voter is assigned a strict ordering of A, r(A), which will be relevant only in cases of indi¤erences. The expression ir(A)j means that, according to the strict ordering r(A), element i 2 A ranks higher than j 2 A and r(A)j X denotes the restriction of r(A) to X A.
Considering that R(A) is the set of all strict orderings of the set A N and R = [ N R( ), we assume that: a) if A is …nite, then the fraction of the constituency of y j that is assigned r(A) is equal to the fraction of the constituency of y j that is assigned r 0 (A), for every r(A); r 0 (A) 2 R(A) and every j 2 f1; 2; :::; rg, 11 and b) if A is in…nite, then the strict ordering assigned to each voter is the one that is compatible with the natural order of the elements of A. 12 All potential candidates know that, after Y is determined, strict orderings of A will be assigned to voters according to the above essentially unbiased procedure and, hence, they take this information into account when they make their strategy choices.
A voter votes for up to k 2 N + active candidates according to some voting behavior. A voting behavior is understood to be a function which maps ideal policies, potential candidates' strategy pro…les and strict orderings of A into subsets of A with cardinality at most equal to k. That is, if a voter with ideal policy w follows voting behavior when potential candidates' strategy pro…le is Y and the strict ordering assigned to her is r(A), then the voter will give exactly one vote to each We allow each voter to follow any voting behavior, , as long as it is minimally sincere. A voter is understood to behave in a minimally sincere way if she votes for her top-ranked candidate(s). This assumption is quite general as: a) it does not require that all k votes are actually used by a voter and b) it allows di¤erent voters to behave di¤erently. Moreover, this behavior is in line with voters' behavior in relevant papers, which also study elections in which voters are allowed to vote for more than one candidate. In particular, sincerity notions developed in Brams and Fishburn (1978) , Dellis and Oak (2006) and Dellis and Oak (2015) are conceptually compatible with (and they are actually stricter than) minimal sincerity, taking into account of course di¤erences in the contexts of analysis.
We now proceed to introduce formally the notion of minimal sincerity. To do this we …rst need to de…ne the set of top-ranked active candidates purely win-motivated; they maximize the probability of being elected. They moreover strictly prefer the pure strategy Out to any pure strategy which gives them zero election probability and they strictly prefer any strategy which gives them positive election probability to the pure strategy Out.
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Given that the set of instrumental players coincides with the set of potential candidates: 16 a)
a Nash equilibrium of the described game may be de…ned only in terms of potential candidates' strategies and b) in what follows we use the terms player and potential candidate interchangeably.
Our game sums up to the following: Stage 4. Vote-masses are computed and players get their payo¤s. 13 This is true for every k except for k = 1 (plurality). In that case minimal sincerity coincides with standard sincere voting -one votes for one's top-ranked candidate.
14 This assumption is without loss of generality because -as it will be clear in the next few paragraphs where we introduce our equilibrium notion -we are interested only in equilibria that are robust to every possible pro…le of minimally sincere voting behaviors. That is, all our equilibrium analysis continues to hold, even if one assumes that candidates have incomplete information about the pro…le of minimally sincere voting behaviors. 15 Alternatively, one could assume that there is a positive cost in declaring candidacy. As it will be evident during the formal analysis, each equilibrium of our game survives such a switch in assumptions if the entry cost is su¢ ciently small. Hence, we prefer to stick with the original formulation of Osborne (1993). Moreover, notice that the set of strategies of each player is not a convex set and hence existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies cannot be established/ruled-out by the means of standard theorems (for example, Debreu 1952) . 16 A voter in this model is essentially parametric since, given a potential candidates'strategy pro…le Y , her behavior is fully characterized by her ideal policy, a strict ordering of A and a function .
We will focus only on Nash equilibria that, given a k-vote rule and a distribution of ideal policies, F , exist for every possible pro…le of minimally sincere voting behaviors. That is, we will describe equilibria whose existence does not hinge on the exact beliefs that candidates hold regarding voters' behavior. We do that because we consider that equilibria which exist only for some minimally sincere voting behaviors do not represent a really robust prediction of the model. De…nition 3 (Behaviorally robust equilibrium -BRE) Given a k-vote rule and a distribution of ideal policies, F , a players'strategy pro…le is a BRE if for every pro…le of minimally sincere voting behaviors no player has incentives to unilaterally change her strategy.
Next, we give a formal description of what we call a non-degenerate set of distribution functions.
We do this because our aim is to prove that for every k 2 an equilibrium exists for a non-degenerate class of voters'preference pro…les. Since a class of preference pro…les coincides in this model with a set of probability distributions over [0; 1], one needs a proper de…nition of such a set before stating the results.
De…nition 4 (Non-degenerateness) A set, S, of admissible distribution functions is non-degenerate if: a) it contains at least two admissible distribution functions, F 1 and F 2 , such that
for every x 2 (0; 1) and b) it contains every admissible distribution function, F , such that
Finally, we comment on why we assume an in…nite set of potential candidates. We do that to be able to state our results only as a function of k. One can instead assume that N is …nite without adding anything to the intuition that we get from our results. Apart from complicating the conditions, when N is …nite and k #N 2 , the convergent free-entry equilibria identi…ed by Cox (1987) , which are such that all #N potential candidates enter the race, exist in our game. Obviously, these equilibria raise serious plausibility issues since the number of active candidates has to coincide with the cardinality of the set of potential candidates. That is, the number of active candidates in these convergent equilibria is essentially exogenous. They describe a situation in which an extra candidate would get elected with positive probability but there simply is no extra potential candidate to enter. Thus, the assumption N = N + is actually an equilibrium re…nement tool which helps us focus on equilibria which are free of such concerns.
3 Equilibrium analysis
Preliminary results
We …rst present a set of results which describe outcomes that may not be expected in equilibrium. We
show that in equilibrium the set of active candidates may not be in…nite, that there are generically 8 no equilibria when voting takes place according to the plurality rule and that elections under k-vote rules never admit convergent equilibria.
Lemma 1 For every k 2 N + , the set of active candidates, A, cannot be in…nite in a BRE.
Proof. This trivially follows from the assumption that each player prefers the pure strategy Out to any pure strategy which gives her zero election probability. If in…nite players enter and each gets a positive election probability, then it must be the case that v i (y 1 ; y 2 ; :::) = v for every i 2 A because candidates who have positive election probability are the ones who tie in the …rst place. Hence, each player should enjoy the same election probability p > 0. But P i2A p > 1 when p > 0 and A in…nite and, hence, A cannot be in…nite in any BRE.
We note that the substantial implication of this result (namely, that in equilibrium we cannot have an arbitrarily large number of active candidates) is robust to all conceivable voters' behaviors and it is not speci…c to the particularities of the current formulation. Independently of how voters vote, when in…nite candidates enter the race, only a subset of them will enjoy an election probability larger than any …xed c > 0. That is, considering an arbitrarily small entry cost and that candidates enter if and only if their election probability is larger than this arbitrarily small entry cost, would be enough to eliminate the possibility of equilibria with arbitrarily many active candidates for every possible set of assumptions regarding voters'behavior.
Given that our in…nite-player game is symmetric, it directly follows that if an equilibrium with a 2 N + active candidates exists, then in…nitely many similar equilibria with a 2 N + active candidates should exist too, which would only di¤er in the identities of the active candidates and not in the strategies that the active candidates employ. If we assume that in an equilibrium with a 2 N + active candidates we have that 0 y 1 y 2 ::: y a 1 and that y i = Out for every i a + 1 then we can signi…cantly reduce the complexity of exposition of the results that follow without any loss of generality.
Proposition 1 If k = 1 then there is no BRE for almost every F (Osborne 1993).
Proof. The proof of this result is a simple combination of our lemma 1 and Osborne (1993).
We now turn attention to k-vote rules with k 1 and we …rst investigate possibility of a convergent equilibrium.
Lemma 2 If k 1 there is no BRE such that all active candidates o¤er the same platform.
Proof. By lemma 1 we know that in every BRE a is …nite. Consider that (ŷ 1 ;ŷ 2 ; :::ŷ a ;ŷ a+1 ; :::) is a BRE such thatŷ 1 =ŷ 2 = ::: =ŷ a =ŷ 2 [0; 1] andŷ a+1 =ŷ a+2 = ::: = Out. Then if player a + 1 deviates from Out toŷ 2 [0; 1] she will get an election probability of
she is strictly better o¤ by entering atŷ compared to staying Out and, hence, the strategy pro…le (ŷ 1 ;ŷ 2 ; :::ŷ a ;ŷ a+1 ; :::) cannot be a BRE. This is a result that we know from Cox (1987) ; k-vote rules with k 1 can give convergent equilibria if and only if the cardinality of the set of potential candidates is small enough compared to k (the exact condition is k
#N 2
). As it is evident, when the set of potential candidates is in…nite no convergent equilibrium exists for any k-vote rule.
Symmetric two-location equilibria
In what follows we investigate the possibility of divergent equilibria. In most of our analysis we focus on symmetric two-location equilibria (half active candidates locate at one point and the other half at some other point; n(y
) and we prove that every k-vote rule with k 2 may support an equilibrium of this sort for a non-degenerate class of voters'preferences. The next lemma provides an upper and a lower bound for the cardinality of the set of active candidates in such an equilibrium.
Lemma 3 Every symmetric two-location BRE must be such that: a)
Proof. The proof of the …rst part of the lemma is straightforward: if all voters never vote for a candidate whom they like strictly less than some other (top-voting), then the only way in which a pro…le with n(y 1 ) = n(y 2 ) = a 2 may be a Nash equilibrium is when
= m. Since a BRE is de…ned as such only if it is robust to every pro…le of minimally sincere voting behaviors (including the one considered here), it follows that in every symmetric two-location BRE it must be the case that Moreover, it should hold that 1 2
because otherwise a player could deviate from Out to a location to the right and arbitrarily close to y 1 and get a vote-mass strictly larger than k a
, and hence win with certainty. Combination of these two inequalities gives a 4k. Assume now that a = 2k.
Then, if all voters vote for all the k candidates they like best (full-voting), one of the k candidates located at y 1 can deviate to y 1 + " and increase her vote-mass while the vote-mass of each of the k 1
candidates who remain at y 1 is unchanged and the vote-mass of each of k candidates who are located
]=k > 0. That is, this is a pro…table deviation since it leads to a certain election. Similar arguments rule out all cases with a 2k. Hence, in a BRE it should be the case that a > 2k or else that a 2k + 2.
The fact that such divergent equilibria allow for at most 4k active candidates is very important as it establishes not only that such equilibria rule out free-entry but, perhaps more importantly, that the maximum number of active candidates in such equilibria does not relate to the cardinality of the set of potential candidates. In contrast, the maximum number of active candidates of the divergent and no-free-entry equilibria of the standard runo¤ rule (Brusco et al. 2012 ) is essentially equal to the cardinality of the set of potential candidates.
Next, we fully characterize all symmetric two-location equilibria. 
C) for every y 2 (y 1 ; y 2 ) we have 2k + 2 a < 2k maxfF (
Proof. We …rst deal with the if direction; that is, we …rst show that the above conditions are su¢ cient for the existence of a BRE. To this end we assume that active candidates locate at y 2 , and that all three conditions of the above propositions hold. If a player deviates from Out to y < y 1 (or to y > y 2 ) she gets a vote-mass strictly less than F (y 1 )
(1 F (2m y 1 )) due to minimal sincerity and condition C (2k + 2 a) and hence she loses with certainty because each active candidate at y 2 (y 1 ) gets a vote-mass at least equal to k a due to minimal sincerity and condition C (2k + 2 a), which is larger or equal to F (y 1 ) (1 F (2m y 1 )) due to condition B. If a player deviates from Out to y = y 1 (or to y = y 2 ) she gets a vote-mass equal to k a+2 due to minimal sincerity and condition C (2k + 2 a) and hence she loses with certainty because each active candidate at y 2 (y 1 ) gets a vote-mass equal to k a due to minimal sincerity and condition C (2k + 2 a). If a player deviates from Out to y 2 (y 1 ; y 2 ), she gets a vote-mass equal to
) due to minimal sincerity and condition C (2k + 2 a) and hence she loses with
), then each active candidate at y 2 gets a vote-mass at least equal to
)]2k a due to minimal sincerity and condition C (2k + 2 a), which is strictly larger than F (
then each active candidate at y 1 gets a vote-mass at least equal to
)2k a due to minimal sincerity and condition C (2k + 2 a), which is strictly larger than F ( if an active candidate deviates from y 1 (y 2 ) to some other y, her vote-mass will coincide with the vote-mass of a player who deviates from Out to the same y -which we have already computed -and it can be shown to be strictly smaller than the vote-mass of some other active candidate with arguments similar to the ones above. Finally, a deviation of an active candidate to Out is straightforwardly unpro…table since, in every pro…le that has the described characteristics, every active candidate has a positive election probability.
We now turn attention to the only if direction; that is, we now aim to establish that the described three conditions are necessary for a symmetric two-location BRE to exist. From lemma 3 we know that condition A and the …rst part of condition C (2k + 2 a) must hold in every symmetric twolocation BRE and they are hence necessary conditions. Assume that there is a symmetric two-location BRE such that condition B does not hold -consider, without loss of generality, that
all voters vote for all the k candidates they like best (full-voting), then a player may deviate from
Out to y < y 1 but arbitrarily close to it and get a vote-mass strictly larger than k a and win with certainty. This is so because condition A and the …rst part of condition C (2k + 2 a) -which are already proved to be conditions that must hold in a BRE -along with full-voting, suggest that every other active candidate will get a vote-mass at most as large as k a
. Hence, if condition B does not hold then we are not in a BRE and it is therefore a necessary condition too. Finally, consider that there is a BRE such that the second part of condition C does not hold. That is, there exists y 2 (y 1 ; y 2 )
such that either a 2kF (
). In such a case a player may deviate from Out to this y and win with positive probability. This is so because if, for example, this y is such that a ) (due to minimal sincerity and the …rst part of condition C), while an active candidate located at y 1 gets a vote-mass equal to
)2k a and an active candidate located at y 2 gets a vote-mass equal to
)]2k a when no voter ever votes for a candidate whom she likes strictly less than some other (top-voting); each of these vote-masses are at most as large as
) when a 2kF (
). Therefore, if the second part of condition C does not hold, there exist pro…les of minimally sincere voting behaviors for which a player has incentives to deviate from Out to some y 2 (y 1 ; y 2 ) and, thus, we cannot be in a BRE. This proves that the second part of condition C is also necessary for the existence of a symmetric two-location BRE.
Next we state a direct corollary of the above proposition which will help us with our subsequent analysis. 
Corollary 1 If a symmetric two-location BRE with
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The proof of this result is trivial and it is hence skipped. 17 The implication of this result, though, is of paramount importance in our quest to characterize the classes of preferences pro…les for which each k-vote rule admits a symmetric two-location equilibrium. It suggests that we can concentrate our e¤orts on understanding which F s admit such an equilibrium with 2k + 2 active candidates.
Moreover, we notice that, for a given a, if conditions A and C hold for some pair (y 1 ; y
then they should also hold for the location
. These observations allow us to state the following simpli…ed necessary and su¢ cient condition for existence of a symmetric two-location equilibrium.
Proposition 3 When the ideal policies of the society are distributed according to F and voting takes place according to a k-vote rule, a symmetric two-location BRE exists if and only if there existŝ
and B) for every y 2 (ŷ; 2m ŷ) we have
Again, a formal proof is not necessary since the above proposition naturally follows if one combines proposition 2, corollary 1 and the fact that the fraction in the last part of condition C of proposition 2 is strictly increasing in y 1 for any …xed y 2 (y 1 ; 2m y 1 ).
We notice that k 2k+2 is increasing in k and that 1 + 1 k is decreasing in k. Moreover, we observe that maxfF (ŷ); 1 F (2m ŷ)g is increasing inŷ 2 (0; m) and that for which a symmetric two-location BRE exists under a k-vote rule.
Proof. The …rst part of this proposition has been established by the arguments presented before its statement. If for some F a symmetric two-location BRE exists under ak-vote rule, then a BRE exists under a k-vote rule too for every k >k. Therefore, all F s that belong to k must also 17 It just hinges on the observation that, for a …xed pair (y 1 ; y 2 ), if conditions B and C hold for some a, then they also hold for a = 2k + 2.
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belong to k+1 ; k k+1 . The proof of the second part of this proposition is as follows. We notice that lim k!+1
. Hence: a) for every admissible F there existsŷ < m such that
, when k is su¢ ciently large, and b) lim k!+1ŷ = m. Moreover,
Therefore, for every F 2 there exists a large enough k, such that
This proposition formally establishes that the set of distributions of voters' ideal policies, for which symmetric two-location equilibria exist under a k-vote rule, is expanding in k and in the limit (k ! +1) it essentially includes all admissible distributions of ideal policies. Given though that for k = 1 (plurality rule) Osborne (1993) proved that an equilibrium exists for almost no distribution of voters'ideal policies, what is essential to be answered next, is how large need k be in order for such equilibria to exist for non-degenerate classes of voters'preferences. What we …nd is that k may be as small as two.
Proposition 5 k is non-degenerate if and only if k 2.
Proof. We notice that when k = 1 the existence conditions of proposition 3 suggest that F (ŷ) = 1 F (2m ŷ) = then condition B of proposition 3 is not satis…ed for y !ŷ + ). Consider that 1 is non-degenerate and hence that it contains at least two admissible distribution functions F 1 and F 2 such that F 1 (x) < F 2 (x) for every x 2 (0; 1). Then, we de…neŷ F 1 and m
Notice that every admissible
If _ F admits a BRE under k = 1, then it should be such that two candidates locate atŷ F 1 and two candidates locate at 2m
and _ F (m
). But if we are in a BRE then it should also be true that 2m
which may be true only if F 1 (2m
and that is wrong by assumption. Therefore, our initial assumption is incorrect and hence 1 cannot be non-degenerate.
To establish that k is non-degenerate for every k 2, it is su¢ cient to prove that 2 is nondegenerate (proposition 4). We consider that k = 2 and that F (x) 2 (x "; x + ") for every x 2 [0; 1]
and a su¢ ciently small but strictly positive ". We assume that y 1 = m 1 5 , y 2 = m + and hence, for su¢ ciently small ", condition B of proposition 2 holds too. We moreover notice that for every y 2 (y 1
.
That is, for su¢ ciently small ", the second part of condition C of proposition 2 also holds.
Since a BRE exists for every admissible F (x) 2 (x "; x + ") when " > 0 is positive and su¢ ciently small, it follows that there exists a pair of admissible distribution functions F 1 and F 2 which are such that x " < F 1 (x) < F 2 (x) < x + " for every x 2 (0; 1). Obviously, everyF such that
for every x 2 [0; 1] also satis…esF (x) 2 (x "; x + ") and hence 2 is nondegenerate. Since, 2 k for every k 3 it follows that k is non-degenerate if k 2.
But why is the plurality rule so di¤erent compared to every other k-vote rule with k 2?
The reason why symmetric two-location equilibria almost never exist under the plurality rule, lies in the following facts: a) a candidate located at y 1 must be sharing this location with at least one other candidate because otherwise she would have incentives to move towards the right and gain votes and b) a candidate located at y 1 must be sharing this location with at most one other candidate. If . Since this …rst location is uniquely de…ned for every F and since the second location, y 2 , has to satisfy at the same time y 2 = 2m
) and
) -which are both satis…ed by almost no F -it trivially follows that such pairs of locations exist for almost no F and subsequently that 1 cannot be non-degenerate (a similar reasoning rules out existence of any kind of equilibria for almost all F s under the plurality rule).
When voters are allowed to vote for more than one candidate, though, things change dramatically.
Consider, for example, that k = 2 and that three candidates are located at y 1 and three at y 2 = 2m y 1 .
Then each of the candidates located at y 1 is voted by a fraction 2 3 of the constituency of y 1 (which is much larger than half of the constituency of y 1 ). This means that in equilibrium the left semiconstituency of y 1 need not be precisely as large as the right semi-constituency of y 1 ; as long as
) none of the three candidates located at y 1 has any incentives to deviate marginally to the left or marginally to the right of y 1 . Since the admissible values for a y 1 are in…nitely more compared to the plurality rule, it directly follows that equilibrium possibilities are in…nitely more too.
Of course more conditions on top of F (y 1 ) 2 ( ) need to hold in order for the posited pro…le to constitute an equilibrium (conditions that guarantee that entry of other candidates and deviations far away from y 1 are also unpro…table). But the fact that this …rst condition speci…es a non-degenerate range of locations that may be part of an equilibrium sums up the intuition why stability in electoral competition under a k-vote rule with k 2 may actually be reached.
After having shown that stability in electoral competition is feasible 18 for each k-vote rule with k 2, one would naturally want to have a better understanding of the sets of distribution functions that guarantee equilibrium existence. First, we show that every k-vote rule with k 2 admits a symmetric two-location BRE when the distribution of voters' ideal policies is log-concave. 19 That is, existence of such equilibria is quite general since log-concavity is satis…ed by many distributions (including the popular families of unimodal beta, truncated normal, distributions with linear densities and many other).
Proposition 6 k contains all admissible distributions that satisfy log-concavity if and only if k 2.
Proof. Notice that F (x) = x (uniform distribution) is an admissible distribution that satis…es logconcavity. When k = 1 condition A of proposition 3 suggests thatŷ = ) that satis…es log-concavity and every k 2, there existsŷ 2 (0; m) that satis…es the two conditions of proposition 3 and hence a symmetric two-location BRE exists. First, we argue that when an admissible F is log-concave, then indeed there existsŷ 2 (0; m) such that
(condition A of proposition 3) for every k 2. Notice that .
That is, the only possibility that there is noŷ 2 (0; m), such that maxfF (ŷ); 1
, is when maxfF (0); 1 F (2m)g > k 2k+2
. We will show that when an admissible F is logconcave, then maxfF (0); 1 F (2m)g 1 4 and, hence, maxfF (0); 1 F (2m)g < k 2k+2
. Assume, on the contrary, that maxfF (0); 1 F (2m)g > 1 4 . Given that F (0) = 0 for every admissible distribution and that m 1 2 it follows that: a) m < , since every admissible distribution is such that F (1) = 1), and b) 1 F (2m) > 1 4 , F (2m) < . These two observations suggest that F fails the 18 The rules that we consider permit partial abstention (that is, a voter is not compelled to use all the k votes). Notice, though, that our genericity results directly apply to k-vote rules that do not allow partial abstention. This is so because not allowing for partial abstention is equivalent to allowing for partial abstention and voters using all their k votes. Since, in our setup voters may be characterized by any minimally sincere voting behavior, including voting behaviors which involve the use of all k votes, a BRE of our game remains an equilibrium when partial abstention is not allowed (that is, when the minimally sincere behaviors are restricted to those which involve the use of all k votes). 19 We consider that F is log-concave if
< 0 and
< 0 for every x 2 (0; 1). Hence, our de…nition of log-concavity implies that F is twice-di¤erentiable as well.
gradual escalating median (GEM) property that all log-concave distribution functions are guaranteed to have (see, for example, Haimanko et al. 2005) . 20 Therefore, our assumption is wrong and hence
; condition A of proposition 3 holds when k 2 for every admissible F that satis…es log-concavity.
As far as condition B of proposition 3 is concerned, we assume without loss of generality that
(now we drop the assumption that m 1 2 ). We notice that
for every y 2 (ŷ; 2m ŷ). So if we show that 1 +
for every y 2 (ŷ; 2m ŷ) we are done. We observe that lim y!ŷ +
(1+ p 5) 1:62. Moreover, we have that
is increasing in y 2 (ŷ; 2m ŷ) due to log-concavity of F . Hence,
for every y 2 (ŷ; 2m ŷ) and k 2; and, thus, when an admissible F is log-concave then both conditions of proposition 3 hold and a symmetric two-location BRE is guaranteed to exist.
In the next part of our analysis we show that if elections take place under a k-vote rule, an equi- Proof. We assume that F is symmetric about its median (F (x) = 1 F (1 x) for every x 2 [0; 1]) and we show that: a) when k = 1 and when k = 2, it is possible that a BRE does not exist, b) when k = 3, a BRE always exists and c) when k = 3, a symmetric two-location BRE also exists for every F in a neighborhood of F . If k = 1, then, according to the proof of proposition 6, there is no symmetric two-location BRE when F is uniform. But since a uniform distribution is also a symmetric one, we have that there exist symmetric admissible F s for which a symmetric two-location BRE does not exist when k = 1.
If k = 2, then, according to proposition 3, a symmetric two-location BRE exists only if there existŝ y < m such thatŷ = F 1 (
) and for every y 2 (ŷ; 1 ŷ) we have either ) and 20 The GEM property requires that as the subset [t; 1] of our society shrinks (that is, as t increases), its median, m t (de…ned by F (m t ) =
1+F (t) 2
), increases slower than t. That is, GEM requires that @mt @t < 1 (GEM imposes symmetric restrictions on the median of the subset [0; t] as well).
In our case, if t = 0 then m t = m < . In other words, t increased by m while m t increased by strictly more than m, which suggests that there exists t for which GEM fails (
). If F is such that for some very small " > 0 we have F ( Therefore, when k = 2, it is possible that a symmetric two-location BRE does not exist, even when F is symmetric about its median.
To show that, if k 3, a symmetric two-location BRE always exists when F is symmetric about its median, we …rst notice that condition B of proposition 3 always holds if
. 21 Condition A of proposition 3 suggests that
. Hence,ŷ < m which satis…es both conditions is guaranteed to exist if
. For k positive, this last inequality is equivalent to k > 1 + p 3, which is true for every k 3.
By the latter, it becomes straightforward that when F is symmetric about its median and k 3, one may …nd _ y < m such that 1+k 2+3k
. That is, if F is symmetric about its median, then there exists a BRE with k + 1 active candidates at _ y and k + 1 active candidates at 1 _ y, where _ y < m is such that condition B of proposition 2 holds with a strict inequality. Now consider an admissible distributionF with medianm such thatF (x) 2 (F (x) "; F (x) + ") for every x 2 (0; 1) and a su¢ ciently small but strictly positive " (that is,F is a distribution in a neighborhood of this symmetric F ) and a strategy pro…le with k + 1 active candidates atm ( This result distinguishes the one-vote rule (plurality) and the two-vote rule from all k-vote rules with k 3 in the sense that the …rst two are not guaranteed to generate stability in electoral competition, even when F is symmetric. We have to stress though that the failure of these two rules is far from being identical in magnitude. Given a symmetric F : a) k = 1 need not admit a BRE when F is log-concave and, perhaps more importantly, even if it admits an equilibrium for a symmetric F , this existence does not extend to distributions in the neighborhood of F (see the discussion that follows the proof of proposition 5), while b) k = 2 admits an equilibrium when F is log-concave (actually, a BRE fails to exist only in very special cases -namely, when there is at least one region to each side of the median that: i) has very little mass and ii) is surrounded by regions with very large masses) and, when it admits an equilibrium for a symmetric F , it generically admits one for every distribution in its neighborhood too. and because maxfF (ŷ)
for every y 2 (ŷ; 2m ŷ).
, then condition B of proposition 3 must hold. 22 This can be established by an argument similar to the one in the end of the proof of proposition 7.
To better demonstrate the di¤erence between the two-vote rule and the plurality rule, we consider that F is a symmetric beta distribution with shape parameter > 0 23 and by applying computational methods (see …gures 1a and 1b) we get that: a) when k = 1 a symmetric two-location BRE exists if and only if 2 (0;^ ) where^ 0:3 (that is, when the society is very polarized) and b) when k = 2 a symmetric two-location BRE exists for every > 0 (from proposition 7 it is straightforward that when k 3 a symmetric two-location BRE exists for every > 0).
[ ) (condition B of proposition 2 simpli…es to this expression when F is symmetric and a = 2k + 2) and b)
That is, social welfare under a k-vote rule is strictly larger than W (2F 1 (
) and at most 23 A shape parameter smaller than one corresponds to a bimodal symmetric beta distribution with modes at zero and one, a shape parameter equal to one corresponds to a uniform distribution and a shape parameter larger than one corresponds to a unimodal symmetric beta distribution with a mode at one half. We further note that a symmetric beta distribution is log-concave if and only if the shape parameter is larger or equal to one (Bagnoli and Bergstrom 2005) . 24 This is the case, for example, when voters'payo¤s are identically and linearly decreasing in the distance between their ideal policies and the implemented one, and social welfare is de…ned as the unweighted sum of voters'payo¤s. 25 When F is symmetric and log-concave, then, for every y 1 < m,
is increasing at every y 2 (y 1 ; 2m y 1 ) and
is decreasing at every y 2 (y 1 ; 2m y 1 ). That is, , and may be rewritten as
19 as large as W (F
)) and the upper bound of equilibrium social welfare increases (W (F 1 (
. Hence, what we …nd, is that giving more votes to voters, increases the variability of equilibrium extremism 26 and subsequently the variability of equilibrium social welfare.
Finally, we try to understand how social welfare relates to the distribution of voters'ideal policies in these equilibria. The shaded areas of …gures 2a, 2b and 2c show admissible values of y 1 as a function of the shape parameter, , of a unimodal symmetric beta distribution for k = 3, k = 5 and k = 10 respectively (the larger the value of , the larger the density of the distribution about the centre of the policy space). As we see, societies composed of like-minded voters ( large) enjoy policies that are on average nearer to the ideal policy of the median voter compared to more polarized societies ( small) and, hence, social welfare seems to react to changes in the distribution of voters'ideal policies in an intuitive manner.
[Insert …gure 2 about here]
Other equilibria
We have analyzed in depth symmetric two-location equilibria under every k-vote rule and we have developed arguments that show that unlike the plurality rule, k-vote rules with k 2 may lead to stability in electoral competition for a non-degenerate class of cases. We need now to explore possibility of other kinds of equilibria, in order to be sure that this identi…ed advantage of k-vote rules with k 2 compared to the plurality rule, extends to all possible con…gurations. One can follow steps similar to the ones we followed above and fully characterize all symmetric 27 r-location equilibria of the game with r 3 under any k-vote rule. Actually one can even show that the set of admissible F s for which a k-vote rule admits a symmetric r-location equilibrium with r 3 is non-degenerate if and only if k 2.
Regarding asymmetric equilibria (equilibria such that there are at least two occupied locations with unequal number of active candidates), one can trivially adapt arguments presented above and show that the set of admissible F s for which the plurality rule admits an asymmetric r-location equilibrium, with r 2 and a active candidates, cannot be non-degenerate for any r 2 and a 1 (Osborne 1993). One can further show that for k-vote rules, with k large, asymmetric two-location equilibria are guaranteed to exist for non-degenerate sets of voters'distributions.
In the Appendix we provide a complete characterization of all these equilibrium classes (symmetric equilibria with at least three occupied locations and asymmetric equilibria with at least two occupied 26 See Dellis (2009) for a treatment of this question in the framework of the citizen-candidate model. 27 Again, symmetric in the sense that n(y 1 ) = n(y 2 ) = ::: = n(y r ).
locations) for every k-vote rule, and we provide formal arguments in support of the claims made above. One needs to stress here though, that despite the possibility of equilibria with many occupied locations and/or asymmetric number of active candidates in each occupied location, symmetric twolocation equilibria are the ones that face the fewest possible coordination issues 28 and the ones which exist under the simplest possible set of conditions, and under this perspective they represent the most likely players'behavior.
Extensions/Concluding remarks 4.1 Uncertainty about voters'preferences
Let us now extend the model by allowing potential candidates to be uncertain about voters'preferences. In speci…c we will assume that potential candidates believe that the real distribution of voters,
where F 1 and F 2 are two admissible distributions such that F 1 (x) < F 2 (x) for every x 2 (0; 1).
Each candidate believes that the real distribution,F (x), belongs to S(F 1 ; F 2 ) and it is such that 
; the probability with which the median of the real distribution is to the left (right) ofm is equal to 1 2 . Without introducing unnecessary formalities we note that now candidates are uncertain about their exact vote-masses given a strategy pro…le, and hence computation of win probabilities becomes signi…cantly more complex.
Everything else about our model remains unchanged (voters'behavior, candidates'objectives, etc.).
Proposition 8 Consider a k-vote rule with k 2 and an admissible distribution F with median m such that, under perfect information, a symmetric two-location BRE exists with 2k + 2 active candidates and maxfF (y 1 ); 1 F (2m y 1 )g < k 2k+2
. Then there exists" > 0 such that, for every " 2 (0;"), the incomplete information game admits a symmetric two-location BRE for every admissible
for every x 2 (0; 1)g and G( ). 28 The less coordination an equilibrium requires, the more likely it should be that players will play according to it. In our framework it is straightforward that, from all possible equilibrium con…gurations, symmetric two-location equilibria are the least demanding as far as players'coordination is concerned.
29 In order to model "continuous" uncertainty we have employed a parametric speci…cation ( ) in line with Roemer (1994).
Proof. The assumption with which we open the statement of the proposition just requires that the existence of a symmetric two-location BRE is not cut-edge for the considered F and k when the information that potential candidates have about voters' preferences is perfect (obviously, it is never satis…ed when k = 1 for any F , since in a symmetric two-location BRE of the plurality rule we must have F (y 1 ) = 1 4 ). Assume that there is incomplete information about voters' preferences given by S( because: a) with probability (y =m+(m y 1 )) since her vote-mass will be with probability one strictly smaller than the vote-mass of each active candidate located atm + (m y 1 ) (m (m y 1 )). Similar arguments rule out deviation of any of the 2k + 2 active candidates to other locations when " > 0 is su¢ ciently small. That is, there exists" > 0 such that for every " 2 (0;") this incomplete information game admits a symmetric two-location BRE for every admissible S(
This result has non-negligible implications as far as robustness of the identi…ed equilibria is con- 
M -winner elections
In reality, most of the times when voters are allowed to vote for more than one candidate, it is the case that there is more than one o¢ ce at stake. In the so-called open-list systems with panachage or a unique candidates'list, voters are allowed to vote for up to k candidates and the M most voted candidates get elected in a council/parliament. In most of these systems, voters have as many votes as the o¢ ces at stake (k = M ). 31 This observation, naturally, leads to the following question: Is our analysis relevant to such M -winner elections?
In the symmetric two-location equilibria that we fully characterized in this paper, at least 2k + 2
candidates enter a race for a single o¢ ce. As we have shown, all individual deviations were unpro…table for any of our players as: a) players which play Out in an equilibrium strategy pro…le, when they deviate to entry at any location, always get a vote-mass strictly smaller than the vote-mass of the k + 1 most voted candidates; and b) players which play y 1 (y 2 ) in an equilibrium strategy pro…le, when they deviate to any other strategy, always get a vote-mass strictly smaller than the vote-mass of the k most voted candidates. That is, any player who deviates …nds herself having a vote-mass strictly smaller than the vote-mass of the k-th most voted candidate. This means that the described strategy pro…les are also equilibria of M -winner elections with M k. an open-list system), then an increase in the number of o¢ ces at stake (for example, an increase in the size of the council/parliament) should also increase the prospects of stable outcomes in electoral competition (proposition 4). Namely, in the framework of such systems, stable outcomes should be more frequently encountered when candidates compete for many seats rather than for only a few. Finally, one could add that systems that permit voters to vote for up to k M candidates, endogenously lead to the emergence of candidates' clusters and hence to endogenous formation of political parties. 31 For example, such rules are used in several Swiss cantons, including Zurich, in Luxemburg and in German local elections. 32 We consider that an active candidate has positive probability of election if and only if the number of candidates with a vote-mass strictly larger than hers is smaller than M . 
Appendix
Symmetric r-location equilibria
Here we explore the possibility of equilibria such that more than two locations are occupied. We focus on symmetric r-location equilibria (n(y i ) = a r for every i 2 f1; 2; :::; rg) with r 3. Transition from two-location strategy pro…les to pro…les with many occupied locations naturally brings along complications in many parts of the analysis but, surprisingly, it also simpli…es some speci…c issues.
For example, when we are in a two-location pro…le and we consider a deviation of a player from Out to some location in between the two occupied ones, it is obvious that the vote-masses of all active candidates will be a¤ected. In case we are in an r-location pro…le, though, with r 3, a deviation of a player from Out to any location need not a¤ect the vote-masses of all active candidates. This is so because when each occupied position is shared by at least k + 1 candidates, each occupied location acts as a bulkhead which isolates adjacent constituencies: if there are at least k + 1 candidates at each occupied location and a player enters at y 2 [y i ; y i+1 ], then it is impossible that this will a¤ect voting behavior of voters with ideal policies to the right of
(to the left of
) and, hence, vote-masses of players located at y i+2 (y i 1 ) cannot be a¤ected.
First, we will show that like in the two-location equilibria case, the number of active candidates in an r-location equilibrium is also bounded from above and from below. Then we will fully characterize the set of symmetric r-location equilibria for every admissible F and every k-vote rule and, …nally we will show that the set admissible distributions for which a k-vote rule with k 2 admits a symmetric r-location equilibrium is non-degenerate for every r 3. Given that to establish these results one essentially has to repeat many arguments already presented in the proofs of the two-location case, we only highlight here the necessary steps that do not directly follow from our previous analysis.
Lemma 4 Every symmetric r-location BRE must be such that: a)
) for every i 2 f1; 2; :::; r 1g and b) a 2 [rk + r; 2rk].
Proof. The argument that supports the second part of this lemma is identical to the argument used to support its r = 2 version in lemma 3: if n(y 1 ) k and voters vote for all their n(y 1 ) top-ranked candidates then a candidate located at y 1 strictly increases her vote-mass by moving towards y 2 while at the same time the vote-masses of all other active candidates either decrease or remain una¤ected.
Thus, in a symmetric r-location BRE it has to be the case that n(y 1 ) k+1 =) a rk+r. Moreover, if a rk + r then in every symmetric r-location BRE it has to be the case that each constituency is equal to 1 r
. That is, we have for example F (
and F (
) F (
, and in general F (
). Finally, if a rk + r, then it also has to be the case that
. This is so because in a symmetric r-location BRE a non-entrant can always deviate from Out to a location that gives her a vote-mass arbitrarily close to , and in such a case at least some of the active candidates will continue to receive a vote-mass equal to
Hence for such a deviation not to be pro…table the presented inequality has to hold. .
Proof. To prove this proposition one can follow very similar steps to the ones in the proof of proposition 2: …rst, by assuming that players use such a strategy pro…le, we can show that any deviation of any player is unpro…table (this establishes that the three conditions of the present proposition are su¢ cient for equilibrium existence) and then, given that condition A and the …rst part of condition C have already been proved to be necessary conditions by lemma 4, we can argue that condition B and the second part of condition C are equivalently necessary for existence of an equilibrium. The only di¤erence compared to the two-location case is that when players play according to the posited pro…le and a player deviates from Out to any y, there is at least one active candidate who receives a vote-mass equal to k a and no active candidate who receives more than that. Hence, the vote-mass of the player who deviates from Out to any y -which is: a) equal to F (
where i 2 f1; 2; :::; r 1g, b) equal to F ( for the posited pro…le to be a BRE and this leads to condition C which is signi…cantly simpler than the corresponding condition of the two-location case.
For the statement of the next result we need to de…ne r k as the set of admissible distributions for which a symmetric r-location BRE exists when voting takes place under a k-vote rule.
Proposition 10
r k is non-degenerate if and only if r 2 and k 2.
Proof. From proposition 5 we know that 2 k is non-degenerate if and only if k 2. Hence, here we focus on r k for r 3. To understand why r 1 cannot be non-degenerate for any r 3 we …rst note that in a BRE it has to be the case that a = 2r (by lemma 4) and
-otherwise one of the two active candidates at y 1 (y r ) would have incentives to move marginally to the left or to the right and win with certainty. Therefore, if r 1 is non-degenerate for some r 3, it should contain at least two admissible distribution functions F 1 and F 2 such that F 1 (x) < F 2 (x) for every x 2 (0; 1). We denote y 1;
) and y i;F 1 = 2F ) and . Therefore, there is no symmetric r-location BRE with r 3 for such an _ F and therefore , that y i+1 = 2F 1 ( i r ) y i for every i 2 f1; 2; :::; r 1g
and that F (x) 2 (x "; x + ") for some positive ". We notice that lim "!0 maxfF (y 1 ); 1 F (y r )g = That is, for every k 2 a symmetric r-location BRE with r 3 is guaranteed to exist when the distribution of ideal policies is su¢ ciently uniform. The argument that takes us from this observation to the conclusion that r k is non-degenerate when r 3 and k 2 is identical to the one in the proof of proposition 5.
Asymmetric equilibria
Finally, we generalize our characterization results in order to take in account asymmetric equilibrium con…gurations as well -that is, equilibria such that the number of active candidates in each occupied location is not necessarily identical. Given that the arguments that support these characterization results are essentially simple adaptations of arguments presented in propositions 2 and 9, we skip the 33 Notice that if r 1 is non-degenerate for some r 3 then it should contain F 1 and F 2 such that F 1 (x) < F 2 (x) for every x 2 (0; 1) and 
27
proofs and only discuss some of their features that deserve our attention. We start by describing all two-location equilibria of the game. g.
For k small, existence of asymmetric two-location equilibria is very hard when distribution of ideal policies is su¢ ciently symmetric. Consider, for example, that F is uniform and that a = n(y 1 ) + n(y 2 )
players enter the race, with n(y 1 ) < n(y 2 ). If this is a BRE then it should be the case that: a) When k is large, though, an asymmetric equilibrium is guaranteed to exist for a non-degenerate set of voters'distributions. Consider, for example, that F is nearly uniform and that 2k + 3 candidates enter the race (k + 1 locate at y 1 = 0:4 and k + 2 locate at y 2 with F (
). Then if k is su¢ ciently large (in speci…c, if k 12): a) each active candidate receives a vote-mass equal to k 2k+3 and, hence, each is elected with equal probability, b) no candidate has incentives to deviate from Out to any y 2 [0; 1] and c) no active candidate has any incentive to deviate to any other location.
Finally, we characterize all r-location equilibria for every k-vote rule with k 2. For economy of space, one is referred to Osborne (1993) for the k = 1 case.
Proposition 12
When the ideal policies of the society are distributed according to F and voting takes place according to a k-vote rule with k 2, an r-location BRE with n(y i ) players located at y i , for i 2 f1; 2; :::; rg and r 3 ( P r i=1 n(y i ) = a), exists if and only if: A)
) for every i 2 f1; 2; :::; r 1g and minfn(y 1 ); n(y 2 ); :::; n(y r )g k + 1, B) maxfF (y 1 ); 1 F (y r )g k a and C) for every y 2 (y i ; y i+1 ), where i 2 f1; 2; :::; r 1g, we have F (
Here the only thing that deserves some attention is why n(y i ) k + 1 for every i 2 f2; :::; r 1g.
In previous proofs we only needed to show that in a BRE minfn(y 1 ); n(y r )g k + 1 and the argument 28 was straightforward. If, for example, n(y 1 ) k and voters use all their k votes (full-voting) then an active candidate located at y 1 has incentives to move marginally to the right as such a motion unambiguously increases her vote-mass. But why should it be the case that n(y i ) k + 1 for every i 2 f2; :::; r 1g when k 2?
As we know in every BRE we must have n(y 1 ) k + 1. Consider that, for some k 2, there exists a BRE such that n(y 2 ) 2 f2; :::; kg and that voters behave in the following way: they always vote for their top-ranked candidate(s) and, in case they have some spare votes, they vote for the candidate who o¤ers the third most-leftist platform as long as she is distinctly-positioned (that is, as long as she does not share her position with anybody else). 34 If we are in equilibrium it must be the case that all candidates get the same vote-mass. If a candidate located at y 2 deviates to y 3 " then: a)
her vote-mass strictly increases (she is voted at least by those voters who were voting for her when she was at y 2 and by the voters with ideal policies between ) and b) the vote-mass of each of the other active candidates either remains unchanged or decreases. This is so, because all other candidates are voted only by voters who rank them …rst. That is, there can be no BRE with n(y 2 ) 2 f2; :::; kg when k 2.
Now consider that, for some k 2, there exists a BRE such that n(y 2 ) = 1 and that voters behave in the following way: they always vote for their top-ranked candidate(s) and, in case the have some spare votes, they vote for the candidate who o¤ers the second most-leftist platform as long as she is distinctly-positioned. Since in a BRE every candidate receives exactly the same vote-mass, these assumptions suggest that n(y i ) k for every i 6 = 2. If this were not true, a candidate located at y i 6 = y 2 would be voted only by the constituency of y i while the candidate located at y 2 would be voted both by the constituency of y 2 and by the constituency of y i . This suggests that in a BRE with n(y 2 ) = 1 the candidate located at y 2 would be voted only her constituency and, hence, the vote-mass of each active candidate should be equal to the constituency of y 2 . But since k 2, a player could deviate from Out to y 2 and get voted by all the constituency of y 2 without a¤ecting the vote-masses of all other active candidates. That is, a player deviating from Out to y 2 would get a positive election probability and, subsequently, no BRE with n(y 2 ) = 1 may exist when k 2.
Summing up all the above, we conclude that in a BRE it must be the case that n(y 2 ) k + 1.
Applying similar arguments we can establish that in a BRE it must be the case that every occupied location is shared by at least k + 1 candidates. 34 This voting behavior might not be the most intuitive one but it is consistent with minimal sincerity. 
